Price Risk and Risk Management in Agriculture by Udo Broll et al.
Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
17
This note studies the risk-management decisions of a risk-averse farmer. The farmer faces multiple 
sources of price uncertainty. He sells commodities to two markets at two prices, but only one of 
these markets has a futures market. We show that the farmer’s optimal commodity futures market 
position, i.e., a cross-hedge strategy, is actually an over-hedge, a full-hedge, or an under-hedge 
strategy, depending on whether the two prices are strongly positively correlated, uncorrelated, or 
negatively correlated, respectively.
Introduction 
In today’s economy, farmers and agribusiness firms 
face a high degree of risk because of certain new fac-
tors, such as the increased price volatility of inputs and 
outputs, climate change, international trade restric-
tions, new and more stringent food safety standards, 
and greater public concern about the environment, to 
name only a few. These developments coincide with 
major changes in the fundamentals of the agriculture 
market (UNCTAD, 2011). A critical issue in agricul-
ture is adjusting supply and price risk. The role of 
economic risk is particularly important for pricing in 
commodity futures markets. In developed economies, 
farmers have access to commodity futures markets in 
which they can hedge the price risk.
Since 2006, there have been significant price fluc-
tuations in major food commodities on international 
markets. Between early 2006 and mid-2008, grain and 
cereal prices more than doubled in real terms before 
falling sharply during the second half of 2008. From 
2010 through 2012, prices again increased rapidly and 
generated fears that the global market was entering 
a phase of sustained commodity price volatility. Al-
though short-term coping strategies are important – 
particularly in economies that are negatively affected 
by rising food prices (Prakash, 2011; Prakash, & Gil-
bert, 2011) – an important part of the economic policy 
debate addresses the question of whether these recent 
price fluctuations are the result of speculation in the 
futures markets or whether they simply reflect the un-
derlying economic fundamentals.
However, futures markets in the real world are far 
from complete. For example, less-developed countries 
and economies in transition – places in which risk-
sharing markets are embryonic and markets are heav-
ily controlled – are unlikely to have futures markets for 
agricultural goods. Farmers that are exposed to com-
modity price uncertainty must therefore rely on com-
modity futures contracts on related goods to indirectly 
hedge against their price-risk exposure (Allen and Lu-
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eck, 2003; UNCTAD, 2011). Such a risk-management 
technique is referred to as cross hedging (see, e.g., 
Anderson and Danthine, 1981; Broll, Wong, & Zilcha, 
1999; Chang, & Wong, 2003; Frechette, 2000; Haigh, & 
Holt, 2000; Hudson, 2007). An important part of the 
policy debate in agriculture addresses the question of 
whether commodity price volatility results from specu-
lation in the futures market or whether it simply reflects 
the underlying economic fundamentals (e.g., Gilbert, 
2010; Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], 2011; 
Ziegler, 2012). In this context, there is growing concern 
that financial investment into commodity derivatives 
may have become an independent source of price be-
havior and is causing the recent volatility.
The purpose of this note is to provide theoreti-
cal insights into optimal cross-hedging strategies for 
farmers’ contracts. To that end, we consider a risk-
averse farmer who sells his output to two markets; 
however, only one of these markets has a futures mar-
ket to which the farmer has access. We show that the 
farmer’s optimal futures position hinges on the bivari-
ate dependence of the random commodity prices in 
the separate markets. To derive concrete results, we 
propose the concepts of strong correlation. We show 
that the farmer can find an optimal solution through 
over-hedging, full-hedging, or under-hedging strate-
gies, depending on whether the two random prices are 
strongly positively correlated, uncorrelated, or nega-
tively uncorrelated, respectively.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. The 
next section develops the model of a farmer facing 
price risk and cross-hedging opportunities, and the 
section following that describes the farmer’s optimal 
commodity futures hedging strategy. The final section 
concludes.
The Model
We consider a farmer who produces two final outputs, 
indexed by  1 = i  and 2. Let  i x  and  i p  be the amount 
of outputs and the per-unit selling commodity price 
in market i, where  1 = i  and 2. Profit risk comes from 
two sources,  1
~ p  and  2
~ p , which denote the pricing of 
the random goods in markets 1 and 2, respectively (the 
tilde  ) (
∼  denotes a random variable). Cross hedging is 
modeled by allowing the farmer to trade infinitely di-
visible futures contracts in the market for the first good 
at the forward rate, denoted by 
f p1 . There are no direct 
hedging instruments for the random price of the sec-
ond good,  2
~ p .
The farmer’s profits are given by 
, ) ~ ( ~ ~ = ~
1 1 2 2 1 1 h p p x p x p
f − + + Π  (1)
where  h is the number of futures contracts sold (pur-
chased, if negative). The farmer is risk averse and possess-
es a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function,  ) (Π U , 
which is defined over its profits, Π, with  0 > ) (Π ′ U  and 
0 < ) (Π ′ ′ U . For a given production, the farmer’s decision 
problem is to choose his futures market position, h, to 
maximize the expected utility of its profits 
)  ] ~ ( [ E max Π U
h
 (2)
where  ) ( E ⋅  is the expectation operator. The first-order 
condition for program (2) is given by 
0   , = )  ] ~ )   ( ~ ( [ E 1 1
* p p U
f − Π ′  (3)
where an asterisk  ) (
*  indicates an optimal level. Given 
the assumed properties of  ) (Π U , the second-order 
condition for program (2) is satisfied.
Optimal Risk Management Policy
To examine the farmer’s optimal futures position, 
* h , 
we write equation (3) as
0   , = ] ~ )  , ~ ( [ cov )  ] ~ ( E )][ ~ ( [ E 1
*
1 1
* e U p p U
f Π ′ − − Π ′  (4)
where  ) , ( cov ⋅ ⋅  is the covariance operator. (Please note 
that for any two random variables, x ~ and  y ~, we have 
) ~ ( E ) ~ ( E ) ~ ~ ( E = ) ~ , ~ ( cov y x y x y x − .) Evaluating the left-
hand side of equation (4) at  1
* = x h  yields 
} ~ ]  , ~ [ { cov )  ] ~ ( E )]}[ ~ [ { E 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 p x p x p U p p x p x p U
f f f + ′ − − + ′ +
} ~ ]  , ~ [ { cov )  ] ~ ( E )]}[ ~ [ { E 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 p x p x p U p p x p x p U
f f f + ′ − − + ′ + . (5)
If the above expression is positive, zero, or negative, 
equation (4) and the strict concavity of  )  ] ~ ( [ E Π ′ U  im-
ply that 
* h  is greater than, equal to, or less than  1 x , 
respectively.
It is impossible to determine the sign of expression 
(5) without imposing concepts of bivariate depen-
dence upon  1
~ p  and  2
~ p . Thus, we offer the following 
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Definition: The random variable, x ~, is said to be 
strongly positively correlated, uncorrelated, or negatively 
correlated to the random variable,  y ~, if, and only if, 
)  ] ~ ( , ~ [ cov y f x  is positive, zero, or negative, respectively, 
for all strictly increasing functions,  ) (⋅ f .
This definition is motivated by similarly ordered 
random variables in Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya 
(1934) and Ingersoll (1987). An example of strongly 
correlated random variables is the following linear 
specification:  ε β α ~ ~ = ~
1 2 + + p p , where α  and β  are 
scalars, and ε ~ is a zero-mean random variable inde-
pendent of  1
~ p . This linear specification is widely used 
in the hedging literature.
Result 1: Given that the farmer is allowed  to trade 
commodity futures contracts, if  1
~ p  and  2
~ p  are strongly 
uncorrelated, then the farmer’s optimal future posi-
tion, 
* h , is greater than, equal to, or less than  1 x , de-
pending on whether 
f p1  is greater than, equal to, or 
less than  ) ~ ( E 1 p , respectively. If  1
~ p  and  2
~ p  are strongly 
positively (negatively) correlated, then the farmer’s op-
timal future position, 
* h , is greater (less) than  1 x , when 
) ~ ( E ) ( 1 1 p p
f ≤ ≥ .
Proof: If  1
~ p  and  2
~ p  are strongly uncorrelated, then 
the covariance term of expression (5) vanishes. Thus, 
expression (5) is positive, zero, or negative, depending 
on whether 
f p1  is greater than, equal to, or less than 
) ~ ( E 1 p , respectively, which implies that 
* h  is greater 
than, equal to, or less than  1 x , respectively.
If  1
~ p  and  2
~ p  are strongly positively (negatively) 
correlated, then the covariance term of expression (5) 
is positive (negative). Thus, expression (5) is positive 
(negative) when  ) ~ ( E ) ( 1 1 p p
f ≤ ≥ , such that  1
* (<) > x h .
The logic of Result 1 may be shown as follows. 
Considering the variance on both sides of equation 
(1), we have
 
2 1 2 1
2
2 2
2
1 1 ) )   ( ~ , ~ ( cov 2 ) ~ ( var ) )   ( ~ ( var = ) ~ ( var x h x p p x p h x p − + + − Π
2 1 2 1
2
2 2
2
1 1 ) )   ( ~ , ~ ( cov 2 ) ~ ( var ) )   ( ~ ( var = ) ~ ( var x h x p p x p h x p − + + − Π ,   (6)
where var ) (⋅  is the variance operator. Partially differ-
entiating equation (6) with respect to h and evaluating 
the resulting derivative at  1 = x h  yields 
. ) ~ , ~ ( cov 2 = | ) ~ ( var 2 2 1 1 = x p p
h
x h − Π
∂
∂
 (7)
If  1
~ p  and  2
~ p  are strongly positively (negatively) 
correlated, we have 0 (<) > ) ~ , ~ ( cov 2 1 p p . According 
to equation (7),  the farmer finds it optimal to set 
1 (<) > x h  to reduce the variability of its profits. When 
) ~ ( E (<) > 1 1 p p
f , a speculative motivation may induce 
the farmer to sell (purchase) forward contracts. Thus, 
the over-hedging (under-hedging) incentive for risk 
minimization is reinforced by speculative motivations 
when  ) ~ ( E ) ( 1 1 p p
f ≤ ≥ .
If  1
~ p  and  2
~ p  are strongly uncorrelated, we have 
0 = ) ~ , ~ ( cov 2 1 p p . Thus, equation (7) implies that  1 = x h  
minimizes the variability of the farmer’s domestic 
profits. The farmer deviates from this full hedge only 
when  ) ~ ( E 1 1 p p
f ≠ . If  ) ~ ( E (<) > 1 1 p p
f , speculative mo-
tivations induce the farmer to sell (purchase) forward 
contracts, thereby making the over-hedging (under-
hedging) strategy optimal.
Conclusion
In today’s economy, farmers and agribusiness firms 
face a high degree of risk because of certain new fac-
tors, such as greater price volatility for inputs and out-
puts, climate change, international trade restrictions, 
and new and more stringent food safety standards. 
These developments coincide with major changes in 
the fundamentals of the agriculture market. A critical 
issue in agriculture is price risk.
An important topic in the policy debate in agri-
culture concerns the question of whether the volatil-
ity in commodity prices results from speculation in 
the futures market or whether this volatility simply 
reflects the underlying economic fundamentals. In 
this context, there is growing concern that financial 
investment into commodity derivatives based on the 
replication of futures indices has become an indepen-
dent source of price behavior and is causing recent 
patterns of price volatility in these markets.
In this note, we have examined the optimal risk-
management decisions of a risk-averse farmer who 
is facing multiple sources of commodity price uncer-
tainty. The farmer sells commodities to two markets, 
but only one of these has a futures market. We have 
shown that the farmer’s optimal forward position is 
an over-hedge, a full-hedge, or an under-hedge strat-
egy, depending on whether the two random com-
modity prices are strongly positively correlated, un-
correlated, or negatively correlated, respectively.20 Udo Broll, Peter Welzel, Kit Pong Wong
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